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The Ethics of Resisting Deportation 
Rutger Birnie1 
European University Institute 
 
Abstract 
Can anti-deportation resistance be justified, and if so how and by whom may, or perhaps should, 
unjust deportations be resisted? In this paper, I seek to provide an answer to these questions. The 
paper starts by describing the main forms and agents of anti-deportation action in the contemporary 
context. Subsequently, I examine how different justifications for principled resistance and 
disobedience may each be invoked in the case of deportation resistance. I then explore how worries 
about the resister’s motivation for engaging in the action and their epistemic position apply in the 
specific context of anti-deportation action and consider in what circumstances there is not merely a 
right but a duty to resist deportation. The upshot of this argument, I conclude, is that the liberal state 
ought to respond to anti-deportation action not by criminalising disobedience and resistance in this 
field, but rather by creating legal avenues for such actors to influence deportation decision-making. 
Keywords 





In the evening of Monday July 23rd 2018, 21-yeard old Swedish student Elin Ersson 
boarded a Turkish Airlines flight from Gothenburg to Istanbul, but once on board 
remained standing in the aisle and refused to sit down. She had in fact no intention 
of travelling to Turkey, but she had bought a plane ticket that morning, after finding 
out that a 26-year old Afghan asylum seeker would be deported on this plane from 
Sweden to Kabul via Istanbul. As it turned out, the young Afghan in question was 
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not on the plane, but an older Afghan man in his 50s was on board for deportation 
(Anderson and Karasz 2018; Crouch 2018b). Elin declared that she would not sit 
down nor leave the plane until the man was removed from the flight, starting a 
Facebook livestream to broadcast the standoff (Ersson 2018). She initially faced 
mostly criticism from cabin crew as well as other passengers. A British man can be 
heard in the video telling her “I don’t care what you think” and to sit down as she is 
delaying the flight and “frightening the children”—to which Elin defiantly responded 
“I don’t want a man’s life to be taken away just because you don’t want to miss your 
flight” and “he is not safe in Afghanistan, (…) it’s not right to send people to hell”. 
Others can be heard yelling “shut up” and “these are the rules of your country”. 
Eventually, she also garners support—from a Turkish man who voices his agreement 
and a football team near the back of the plane that stands up in solidarity. When a 
flight attendant announces that the Afghan man will be taken off the plane, there is 
applause. When the plane departs with a two-hour delay, both the Afghan man, the 
three security personnel guarding him, and Erin are back in the terminal. 
While the man’s deportation was called off for the moment, he remained in 
custody and was deported at a later date, possibly on a specially chartered flight. Ismail 
Khawari, the 26-year old whose deportation Elin originally tried to prevent, turned 
out to have been deported on a different flight the next day (Hakim 2018). Meanwhile, 
Elin has become somehow of a social media sensation. Her Facebook video had been 
viewed 4.7 million times by the end of the week and versions of the video on 
YouTube and news websites added significantly to that view count. While she declares 
in the video that what she was doing is “perfectly legal” and that she had “not 
committed a crime”, in October Swedish prosecutors announced they would 
prosecute Elin “for crimes against aviation law” at Gothenburg district court, where 
she is now facing a fine and up to six months in jail (Crouch 2018a).  
Elin’s actions are one example of many attempts to resist or frustrate 
deportation proceedings that are considered manifestly unjust by those engaged in 
them. A variety of actors have increasingly sought to challenge deportation decisions 
taken by national immigration control bureaucracies and national government’s 
deportation policies and their implementation more widely. These include would-be 
deportees themselves and ordinary citizens, but also civil society organisations, 
representatives of local authorities, and the receiving states to which they seek to send 
their deportees. Their acts of resistance can take the form of public contestation, non-
cooperation, active frustration, or violent resistance. How should we morally evaluate 
such acts and the agents that engage in them? Can such anti-deportation resistance be 
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justified? If so, how and by whom may, or perhaps should, unjust deportations be 
resisted? 
In this paper, I seek to provide an answer to these questions. There is a small 
but growing literature on the morality of resisting migration controls generally 
(Cabrera 2010; Hidalgo 2015, 2016; Yong 2018). However, this literature has thus far 
focused primarily on a) the rights of migrants themselves to evade or resist controls, not 
that of other actors; and b) the right to resist entry controls specifically, leaving aside the 
specificity of resisting deportation. This paper makes a novel contribution to this 
literature by having a narrower focus when it comes to the policy but a broader focus 
when it comes to the agents of resistance. The narrower focus is relevant because of 
deportation’s distinctiveness from entry controls. Unlike the would-be immigrant, the 
would-be deportee is already present and as such has a different standing vis-à-vis the 
state that enforces migration control. The broader focus on different agents is 
necessary for the same reason, as the would-be deportee not only has different 
standing vis-à-vis the state but also vis-à-vis the other agents I wish to focus on here—
ordinary citizens, local communities and destination states on whose cooperation the 
deporting states relies. 
The paper is also a contribution to the debate on the justification of 
disobedience and resistance to state laws and dictates generally. Contributions to this 
debate often focus on specific types of action, most notably under the headers of 
“conscientious objection” and “civil disobedience”, each supposedly neatly 
distinguishable and with their own justifications and restrictions. However, precise 
distinctions between such categories are difficult to maintain when we seek to apply 
it to a real-world case of disobedient action, such as deportation resistance. Often, 
such action can potentially invoke more than one type of justification, blurring the 
lines between categories established in the abstract by normative theorists. Most 
notably, the justification of different types of action may, even if the goal of the action 
is broadly the same, vary between the different agents which may be involved in the 
action. This brings to the fore the problem of the one-size-fits-all approach to 
justifying resistance and disobedience dominant in academic debates. Instead, this 
paper will argue that in order to defend a normative framework for disobedience in 
the real world, we need an agent-sensitive account of justified resistance.   
The paper starts by describing the main forms and agents of anti-deportation 
action in the contemporary context. Subsequently, I examine how different 
justifications for principled resistance and disobedience, namely a necessity defence, 
a moral communication defence and a personal integrity defence, may each be 
invoked in the case of deportation resistance. I then explore how worries about the 
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resister’s motivation for engaging in the action and their epistemic position apply in 
the specific context of anti-deportation action and consider in what circumstances 
there is not merely a right but a duty to resist deportation. The upshot of this 
argument, I conclude, is that the liberal state ought to respond to anti-deportation 
action not by criminalising disobedience and resistance in this field, as many states 
have done, but rather by creating legal avenues for such actors to influence 
deportation decision-making. 
Forms and agents of anti-deportation action 
There are several ways to distinguish between types of anti-deportation action. The 
first, and perhaps most obvious distinction is between legal and illegal types of action. 
Only the latter are arguably in need of a specific justification, but it is important to 
note that the distinction between ordinary political action and principled but unlawful 
disobedience is of course entirely relative to a given country’s laws and policies—and 
there is wide variation in how states approach this. Nonetheless, the trend seems to 
be going in the direction of increasing criminalisation of deportation disobedience. A 
growing number of states are introducing laws that make it possible or easier to 
impose criminal sanctions on those resisting their own deportation or those helping 
others to do so. Of the 28 EU member states, for instance, 25 explicitly penalise 
irregular stay and 10 prescribe imprisonment as a punishment for non-cooperation 
with an obligation to leave the territory (European Union Agency for Fundamental 
Rights 2014: 5). Facilitating irregular entry is punishable in all EU states except 
Ireland, though most either require that those engaged in the facilitation have a profit 
motive or exempt certain forms of “humanitarian assistance” (or both).2 However, 
eight EU states criminalise all forms of assistance, including humanitarian and non-
profit assistance (European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights 2014: 11). 
Another way of distinguishing within the category of anti-deportation action is 
by looking at the precise forms it takes. There are broadly three forms of anti-
deportation action: public contestation, non-compliance and active resistance. 
Examples of public contestation include demonstrations, political or media 
interventions. These can be engaged in by would-be deportees themselves, such as 
when “deportables” go onto the streets to protest their deportability. One example 
                                                          
2 Austria, France and Malta exempt assistance provided to family members. France additionally 
exempts the provision of legal advice. Germany exempts persons who carry out “specific professional 
or honorary duties”. The United Kingdom exempts persons who act on behalf of an organisation 
that aims to assist asylum seekers and does not charge for its services (European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights 2014: 11).   
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are the 2006 protest marches in several US cities against proposed legislation which 
would raise penalties for illegal immigration and classify undocumented immigrants 
and anyone who helped them enter or remain in the US as felons. The most high-
profile of these marches came on May 1st of that year and was nicknamed “a day 
without immigrants”, when many undocumented Latino immigrants quit their job for 
a day to highlight the extent of their collective contribution to US society. These and 
other such peaceful protests ordinarily remain within the boundaries of the laws of 
liberal democracies. However, sometimes protest strategies by those vulnerable to 
deportation can include unlawful actions, such as the occupation of buildings. The 
first time the sans-papiers movement in France received worldwide media attention was 
in 1996 when the government ordered special police forces to break down the doors 
of a church in Paris to expel those sans-papiers who had been staging a hunger strike 
inside (Freedman 2008). More recently, a collective of failed asylum seekers in the 
Netherlands have occupied and squatted several public spaces and buildings since 
2012 in protest against their deportability, including setting up tents in the streets and 
parks of Amsterdam and (visibly) squatting in an empty church, a garage, a warehouse, 
a former bank, a former arts academy, a school, flats and office buildings around the 
city (Wij Zijn Hier 2018). Such protests are also often instigated or facilitated by those 
who are not themselves subject to deportation, including friends and family members 
of the would-be deportee, schools, employers, work colleagues, neighbourhood 
associations, churches and other religious groups, migrant support groups and activist 
networks or organisations. Sometimes such protest does not have the state or wider 
society as its audience but rather private companies that profit from the detention and 
deportation industries, as in the case of the boycotts of Codex (a catering company) 
and Lufthansa (an airline) (Nyers 2003: 1081).  
Non-compliance with deportation law, secondly, may include both evasion of 
authorities tasked with implementing removals and refusal to cooperate with such 
proceedings. Non-compliance occurs, of course, when deportees themselves do not 
obey the obligation to leave and make efforts to hide from the authorities to avoid 
detection. But it may also take the form of service providers who do not act on their 
obligation to ask for or pass on information about residence status as they are 
required, or public officials refusing to cooperate in effectuating a deportation order, 
such as when mayors order municipal police forces not to use their powers of arrest 
to detain those under an order to leave—or even actively help those targeted for 
deportation to go into hiding, as the mayor of the Dutch town of Weert did with a 
Syrian family in 2016 ("Burgemeester Weert helpt vluchtelingengezin onderduiken"  
2006). While this regularly happens in specific cases where a mayor or local council 
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disagrees with the deportation of a particular individual or family, non-cooperation of 
a lower political level with a higher one is also sometimes adopted as policy. Sanctuary 
cities and states in the US are the best-known example of this, but similar practices 
are found in other countries. When the German federal government passed the 
Übermittlungspflight law requiring all public institutions to report on the legal status of 
those they came in touch with, several Länder including North Rhine-Westphalia, 
Berlin, Hamburg and Hessen issued ordinances exempting elementary and high 
schools and hospitals and doctors from this law (Lebuhn 2013: 44-45). 
Active resistance, lastly, would be the best characterisation of deportees or 
others acting using physical force or the threat of force (at least as defensive force) to 
try and prevent their deportation. Would-be deportees who physically resist their 
arrest or deportation obviously fall under this header, but so do people who refuse to 
allow a plane carrying a deportee to take off, either as fellow passengers (such as Elin 
Ersson) or by chaining themselves to the aircraft or runway, as activists at Stansted 
airport in the UK did last year (Taylor 2017). Another example is the shutting down 
of pre-deportation detention centres (as has happened to Via Corelli in Milan and 
Campsfield House in England) (Nyers 2003: 1081). Forceful or active resistance is, at 
least in its violent variant, universally outlawed. 
Three justifications for resistance and disobedience 
There are good reasons for insisting that there is a general duty to obey the law in 
mostly just political orders, even if we disagree with any particular laws. Some 
emphasise that such political obligation derives from a natural duty to uphold 
institutions that are (at least mostly) just (Rawls 1999), others from our membership 
in political communities governed by laws (Horton 2010) or from the benefits we 
derive from the law as a system of mutual cooperation (Dagger 1997), and still others 
from the procedural (Christiano 2008) or epistemic (Estlund 2008) legitimacy of laws 
that are the product of democratic procedures. However, nearly all authors believe 
that there are limits to this political obligation and that there are conditions under 
which laws may be broken. As a type of action which breaks a particular state law or 
injunction for principled reasons but is distinguishable from revolutionary action in 
its more limited aims (in that it aims at changing particular parts of the system rather 
than overthrowing it), this category of permissible law-breaking is usually discussed 
under the header of “civil disobedience”, a term coined by Henry David Thoreau in 
his 1848 (1996) essay justifying his refusal to pay a state poll tax he believed the US 
government used to finance its war with Mexico and enforce the Fugitive Slave Law. 
The case for civil disobedience, and for limiting its justification to very specific 
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circumstances and types of action, was elaborated by John Rawls in his 1971 Theory of 
Justice. While elements of Rawls’ account have been criticised by political theorists 
since, and alternative accounts have been defended (Feinberg 1979; Raz 1979; 
Morreall 1991; Lefkowitz 2007; Brownlee 2012), Rawls’ definition of civil 
disobedience remains highly influential.  
There are at least three grounds on which principled law-breaking can be 
justified: grounds of necessity, moral communication, and personal integrity. Each 
will be discussed in turn below, along with their applicability to the case of anti-
deportation action. 
Necessity 
The argument from necessity focuses on situations in which disobedience to laws or 
legal dictates may be the only way to prevent harm to vital interests or violation of 
fundamental rights. For such a situation to occur, it is not enough that a law or its 
implementation is merely unjust. Rather this injustice must be of a certain gravity and 
certainty. It must be, in Rawls’ phrasing, a “substantial and clear injustice” and there 
must be “a lot at stake” (1999) for disobedience to be justified. But this way of 
justifying disobedience also implies certain restrictions on when and how it may be 
used to prevent or redress the injustice. It must be, first of all, a proportional response to 
the injustice in question, and it must be a last resort after other, legal, avenues of seeking 
redress have been exhausted. However, the last resort requirement must be sensitive 
to the circumstances of the sufferer of the injustice. As A. John Simmons writes, “the 
most pressing moral causes are often those most intransigently opposed by those in 
power, leading inevitably to intolerably long delays in the pursuit of legal means of 
redress” (2003: 56). Relatedly, in cases where the victims of the unjust law or policy 
are members of groups within society who are persistently marginalised in different 
spheres of life, this gives additional weight to the particular injustice suffered by an 
unjust law (Rawls 1999: 312).  
Do cases of deportation reach the “substantial and clear injustice” threshold? 
There is of course widespread disagreement on this. Some believe all deportations are 
rights-violating and an unjustified exercise of political power (De Genova 2002; 
Walters 2002) while others insist that the state has broad discretionary powers to order 
non-nationals to leave the territories they control (Blake 2010; Miller 2016). 
Elsewhere, I have argued that deportation regularly (but not inevitably) risks violating 
fundamental rights, both through its end-result and through its execution. I have also 
argued that the right to stay in a place where one is a long-term and permanent 
resident and has extensive ties is a fundamental right limiting deportation practice 
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(Birnie 2019). While this not a fully-accepted part of the human rights cannon, some 
principles in international human rights documents and to some extent in state 
practice do support such a right. This right should be taken alongside more 
established human rights. The most notable of these is the right not to be returned to 
a situation where one faces an acute and serious threat to life, liberty or wellbeing, an 
integral part of the international asylum system meant to guarantee that political and 
war refugees are not sent back to their demise. Another prominent one is the right to 
family life, which covers not only the right to privacy but also the preservation of 
family unity, which forbids deportations which break apart family units, and thereby 
protects for instance parents of children with a right to stay from deportation. These 
two rights are familiar enough from human rights practice and constitute formal legal 
limits on states’ power to deport—albeit ones not always respected in practice. When 
any of these three rights are in play, disobedience and resistance can be justified ways 
of seeking to prevent the territorial removal from taking place.  
What adds to the case for disobedience here is that deportation is, in practice at 
least, usually an irreversible act. Once a deportation has been successfully carried out, it 
is exceedingly difficult for the deportee to seek redress and return to the deporting 
country, even when her deportation turns out to have been unjust. Given the speed 
with which many countries now carry out deportations and the increasingly limited 
possibilities of challenging a deportation order pre-removal, the last resort 
requirement must be interpreted very loosely in the case of deportation. 
Rights violations may also occur in the execution of a deportation. For instance, 
the use of excessive force, the practice of detaining would-be deportees for long and 
sometimes indefinite periods of time, and the separation of families in the deportation 
procedure may constitute a violation of fundamental rights in certain circumstances. 
In those cases, resistance or disobedience may be justified when the aim is not so 
much to prevent the deportation itself, but rather to stop the injustices committed as 
part of the highly coercive deportation procedure. Relatedly, disobedience may be 
justified even when it is not aimed at preventing a deportation per se but rather seeks 
to alleviate and protest the unjust effects of deportability. The logic behind sanctuary 
cities, while being sometimes explicitly about defending the right to stay, often is (also) 
specifically justified with reference to the marginalising effects of deportability, and 
as such can be (and is) defended without reference to a right to stay. 
Moral communication 
A second way of justifying law-breaking and disobedience is by defending it as a way 
of communicating moral concern. The aim of such communicative disobedience is to 
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convey disavowal or condemnation of a particular law or policy and draw public 
attention to it, with the ultimate aim of instigating a change in the law or policy. It can 
thus be justified as a way of contributing to the overall justness of the polity and 
system of laws. As Rawls writes, “the social value of principled disobedience is that it 
acts as a stabilising force in society by inhibiting departures from justice and correcting 
departures when they occur” (1999: 336). In confronting state authorities openly, 
principled disobedients force them to justify their conduct in controversial policy 
areas (Brownlee 2007: 179). Moreover, against critique of actions by an individual or 
minority group against laws which enjoy the approval of a democratic majority, the 
moral communication argument emphasises that principled resistance to specific laws 
or injunctions can contribute to, rather than threaten, the democratic legitimacy of a 
liberal state. Disobedience can play a vital role in democratic processes, as a way of 
getting a particular issue which has been stalled or silenced on the political agenda 
(Markovits 2005; Smith 2011), or of addressing the imbalance of political power 
between minorities and majorities (Lefkowitz 2007; Brownlee 2012). Indeed, for 
Kimberly Brownlee the communicative value of disobedience is that it contributes 
“centrally to the democratic exchange of ideas by forcing the champions of dominant 
opinion to reflect upon and defend their views” (2012: 22). 
It is perhaps not immediately clear how deportation resistance can be justified 
on grounds of moral and democratic communication. If, as Daniel Lefkowitz (2007) 
has argued, rights to principled disobedience are derived from the right to political 
participation, and seen as an extension of this right in the sense that is a right to 
continue contributing to the democratic debate even after a certain law has been 
decided on by a majority, it is not clear that those who are explicitly defined as non-
members of the political community (exemplified by their deportability) can have that 
right. However, precisely because they lack access to many of the regular channels of 
political voice available to full citizens, those subject to deportation rely on irregular 
ways of getting their voices heard more than citizens and legal residents, and they may 
more justifiably rely on disobedient action as a counterbalance to their marginalised 
status. Moreover, as would-be deportees might be unjustly excluded from that 
community, the possibility of communicative disobedience is of democratic value to 
both them and those who speak up in their favour. Anti-deportation action frequently 
challenges precisely the democratic exclusion of long-term residents by challenging 
the state’s definition of belonging and membership (Anderson et al. 2011). Anne 
McNevin interprets acts of contestation by irregular migrants themselves as the “new 
frontier of the political—that moment of confrontation and destabilization when one 
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account of justice competes with another to shape what we think of as ‘common 
sense’ justifications for particular status hierarchies” (2011: 5).  
Personal integrity 
A third argument concerns what is more commonly discussed under the header of 
“conscientious objection” and is about whether people’s personal conscience should 
be accommodated by allowing them not to live up to formal expectations, either as 
subjects of the law or as occupants of official positions. The aim of allowing 
disobedience on this account is not (mainly) to prevent or correct injustice or 
contribute to the moral or democratic conversation, but rather to protect the sense 
or personal moral integrity of the disobedient herself—to, as Joseph Raz put it, 
“protect the agent from interference by public authority” (1979). When those in 
official positions responsible for executing governmental decisions with which they 
fundamentally disagree make a deliberate decision not to discharge the duties of their 
office, this is also known as what Joel Feinberg (1979) has referred to as “rule 
departure”. While such acts involve dissociation from and condemnation of certain 
policies or practices, they are not necessarily communicative or even public. Following 
Rawls, we may distinguish two kinds of conscientious non-compliance: conscientious 
refusal with a more or less direct legal injunction or administrative order, when 
authorities are aware of the breach of the law, order or injunction, and conscientious 
evasion, when the act is covert (1999).  
When it comes to deciding on the justifiability of top-down order refusal, a 
distinction should be drawn between those working for agencies whose main purpose 
is to enforce immigration law and those working for organisations which have an 
entirely unconnected purpose. In recent decades, deportation has been increasingly 
“outsourced” by national authorities to actors whose core tasks do not encompass 
deportation enforcement, including schools, hospitals and other service providers, 
regular police forces, local authorities, private actors such as airlines and their crew, 
and in some cases private citizens with a “reporting duty” (Aliverti 2015). All such 
actors may have a right to refuse to be made complicit in the state’s deportation 
efforts, which cannot be legitimately expected from them given their job description. 
Moreover, their role in deportation enforcement may directly conflict with, or 
undermine their capacity to fulfil their core functions. For instance, police efforts to 
combat crime are undermined by their duty to report those with an irregular status as 
this prevents the latter from reporting crimes or assisting in criminal investigations.3  
                                                          
3 A helpful analogy here is with doctors refusing to assist in carrying out death sentences since this 
conflicts with the Hippocratic Oath. 
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Having now discussed the three justifications which may be invoked to resist 
deportation, I turn to three questions which I believe to be central to the normative 
evaluation of acts of deportation disobedience. First, what if the three different 
motivations corresponding to the three justifications outlined above conflict? Second, 
how can the argument for justified deportation disobedience respond to what could 
be called the epistemic objection? Third, when is it merely permissible to resist 
deportation and when, if ever, is there a duty to do so? Each of these questions is 
discussed in turn below.  
Motivation and communication 
Often, the three arguments outlined above are assumed to be complimentary and 
mutually reinforcing. Particularly, the notion that the “clear and substantial injustice” 
and communication requirements must both be satisfied for disobedience to be 
justifiable, as Rawls seemed to argue, is one that remains dominant. On such views, 
resistance cannot be justified when motivated by purely self-interested reasons, and 
the disobedient must therefore prove “conscientiousness” through publicity of their 
actions and non-evasion of any punishment which is prescribed for the disobedient 
act. What sets principled disobedience apart from militant or radical action, then, is 
that it is aimed at moral persuasion rather than coercing change, making the 
communicative element all-important to disobedience’s justification. 
Conscientiousness requires that a certain level of seriousness, sincerity and moral 
conviction is demonstrated, as well as a consideration of the interests of society as a 
whole, not just individual ones: they must, in Rawlsian terms, provide public reasons 
for their action. These “fidelity to law” requirements of publicity and non-evasion are 
also meant to sharply distinguish principled disobedience from ordinary law-breaking, 
with only the latter being characterised as acting wholly self-interestedly.4  
But, as others have already noted, there is actually a fundamental tension 
between necessity and communication defences of disobedience, as they point at 
different motivations for engaging in the disobedient action and different-level 
ultimate goals which imply possibly contradictory strategies, namely directly 
preventing grave injustice on the one hand and achieving structural change on the 
other. It is unfair to demand those facing substantial injustice themselves to prove 
                                                          
4 The ultimate goal of disobedience based on protecting the personal moral integrity of the 
disobedient is different still, namely to evade complicity in injustice. A similar conflict can occur 
between the aim of preventing an unjust deportation and the self-interested motive on the part of 
those not themselves victims of unjust deportation, who wish to protect their own moral integrity by 
not cooperating with the dictates of the national deportation authorities. 
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that their motivations are not wholly self-interested (which they may well be), let alone 
that they abide by publicity and non-evasion requirements. When the goal of 
disobedient action is to avoid severe injustice (rather than, say, to gain unfair 
advantages), whether one is motivated only by one’s own wellbeing and not by 
society’s as a whole is irrelevant. Often, in order to be an effective way of preventing 
harm to vital interests, such action must be the opposite of public: covert, done 
without exhausting legal avenues for contesting the laws in question, and evading 
punishment.5 As Simmons writes, “the aim of paradigm civil disobedients (…) has 
just as often been simply to affect directly social practices, to frustrate evil, or to avoid 
complicity in wrongdoing; and these aims require neither public performance of illegal 
acts nor acceptance of legal penalties for disobedience” (2003: 43). 
In the case of deportation action, the fact that the different ultimate goals 
require strategies that are often contradictory comes out clearly. To prevent 
deportation from happening, would-be deportees themselves and those who support 
them directly (by hiding them or shielding them from immigration authorities) must 
usually keep their action hidden in order for them to be successful. In this sense, the 
deportable are in a particular situation compared even to others facing systemic 
injustice and marginalisation. Monica Varsanyi (2008) contends that the constant 
vulnerability of irregular migrants to the whims of sovereign power when they make 
themselves public as rights-seizing subjects distinguishes their claims from the claims 
made by other marginalised groups whose formal citizenship status is not in question. 
As she writes “it is one thing for homeless individuals or protesters to struggle and 
fight for their rightful space and place in the city. The challenges they face are certainly 
dire at times, but these individuals do not, on the whole, face the added and very real 
possibility of deportation when attempting to claim their rights. (…) If 
[undocumented residents] come forward and claim their rights due to them, they may 
only gain a pyrrhic victory: a win accompanied by a deportation order” (Varsanyi 
2008: 40). Ellerman also notes that acts of noncompliance by those on the polity’s 
margins rarely amount to collective acts of civil disobedience (2010: 408). Being at 
risk of serious injustice has strong marginalising effects which mean that requirements 
                                                          
5 The point about the tension here is not captured by Brownlee’s comprehensive discussion of the 
topic. She does distinguish between civil disobedience (as law-breaching for the purpose of 
communicating our condemnation of a law of policy and, in the case of direct civil disobedience, for 
the purpose of not lending ourselves to the wrong we condemn) both from what she calls “assistive 
disobedience”, which is acting for the purpose of aiding what one sees as a suffering being “openly 
and non-evasively because this will communicate opposition to laws” (2012: 28) and from “personal 
disobedience” as conscientious objection. But Brownlee’s claim that assistive disobedience is 
necessarily communicative leaves out an important category of non-communicative assistive 
disobedience (in which some anti-deportation efforts may fall). 
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to abide by strict rules of “conscientiousness” are out of reach or directly contradict 
the aims of the disobedience.  
Therefore, would-be deportees will often resort not to the communicative 
actions considered the archetype of justified disobedience  but rather to what James 
Scott calls “the weapons of the weak”, non-organised forms of everyday resistance in 
situations of serious marginalisation concerned with immediate, de facto gains rather 
than public and symbolic goals and often using passive forms of noncompliance, 
evasion and deception, such as “foot dragging, dissimulation, desertion, false 
compliance, pilfering, feigned ignorance, slander, arson, sabotage” (1985: xvi).6 
Feasible acts of resistance for would-be deportees are often limited to hunger strikes, 
self-mutilation, suicide attempts, physical struggle, escape, destruction of identity 
documents, adoption of false identities, concealing their irregular status from 
employers and public officials, or mutilating fingerprints to make them illegible 
(Broeders and Engbersen 2007: 1598; Ellermann 2010: 408). 
The use of such non-organised, non-public strategies by deportation 
disobedients is not, I contend, more morally suspect than their public, communicative 
counterparts. What is more, it would be immoral for outside supporters to advertise 
the position of would-be deportees in order to convince others of the injustice of 
their deportation—even if to change minds and laws, such communication and 
publicity is indispensable. This puts those wishing to resist unjust deportations in a 
bind.7 The dilemma is not purely academic. Much real-world deportation resistance 
is not easily categorisable as either aimed at solving individual cases or a focus on 
structural (legal) change. Often the two aims are combined when the contestation of 
deportation in individual cases is accompanied by arguments against deportation that 
apply to a larger category of people, even if this argument can be made more or less 
explicitly. Even within the category of anti-deportation action focused on individual 
                                                          
6 Scott writes: “the most subordinate classes throughout most of history have rarely been afforded 
the luxury of open, organized, political activity. Or, better stated, such activity was dangerous, if not 
suicidal. Even when the option did exist, it is not clear that the same objectives might not also be 
pursued by other stratagems. Most subordinate classes are, after all, far less interested in changing the 
larger structures of the state and the law than in what Hobsbawm has appropriately called ‘working 
the system….to their minimum advantage’” (1985: xv). He goes on: “everyday forms of resistance 
make no headlines” so the publicity requirement is not met, but also claims that “just as millions of 
anthozoan polyps create, willy-nilly, a coral reef, so do the multiple acts of peasant insubordination 
and evasion create political and economic barrier reefs of their own. It is largely in this fashion that 
the peasantry makes its political presence felt” (xvii).  
7 The problem of not distinguishing properly between the different goals and strategies of 
disobedience based on necessity and on communication, respectively, comes out well in the 
discussion between Luis Cabrera and William Smith on the morality of illegally crossing borders 
(Cabrera 2010; Smith and Cabrera 2015).  
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cases  we can then draw a distinction between what Bader and Probst (2018) call 
“personifying” and “exemplifying” protests, between those aimed primarily at 
preventing an individual deportation and those who, rather, use their action in the 
individual case in order to achieve a broader change in public opinion and the law.8 
Some, following the traditional account of justified disobedience, have criticised the 
former type of action for focussing on the deservingness of individual would-be 
deportees or even on protecting specific categories (such as long-term residents, 
nationals from unsafe countries, families with school-going children) at the expense 
of the larger goal of ending all deportations (Maira 2010: 322). The sans-papiers and 
other anti-deportation campaigns have sometimes been criticised (McNevin 2006; 
Walters 2008; McNevin 2011; Tyler and Marciniak 2013; Barker 2015) for reinscribing 
and reinforcing the territorial and membership boundaries against which they should 
struggle. But this seems to put an unfair burden on those seeking to stop immediate 
rights-violations. In those cases in which the aims of preventing immediate injustice 
and that of achieving structural change conflict, it is important to establish that the 
priority always lies with necessity and the individual threatened with deportation 
rather than with moral communication and structural change (or, indeed, protecting 
personal integrity of those running the risk of complicity with injustice). Looking at 
the deportation case, the common assumption that disobedience aimed at 
communication is easier to justify than other types of disobedience9 is wrong and 
possibly dangerous.10   
                                                          
8 Which form of anti-deportation action is more common is unclear. In their longitudinal analysis of 
anti-deportation protests in Germany, Austria and Switzerland (1993-2013), Ruedin, Rosenberger 
and Merhaut (2018: 111) have found that their dominant form is as what they call “solidarity protests 
organised on a local level focusing on individual solutions rather than social or legal change of the 
migration and border regime”, with “little evidence of diffusion or transnational mobilization”. Yet 
the protests they studied are largely within the boundaries of the law, and there is some evidence that 
law-breaking anti-deportation action more often invokes the need for structural change. 
9 Brownlee, for instance, insists that from a moral perspective communicative disobedience is easier 
to justify than non-communicative disobedience because the willingness to run certain risks in order 
to communicate our convictions to others is evidence of our sincerity of our moral conviction, what 
she calls “the communicative principle of conscientiousness” (2012: 29). This is problematic when 
the main risks involved are carried by those whom we are assisting (as in the case of deportation 
resistance). According to Brownlee, “although intervening, thwarting and sabotaging are potential 
ways to honour our convictions in the short run, ultimately, on their own, they do not take other 
people seriously as reasoning moral agents with whom we can discuss the merits of our cause and 
whose conduct we should try to change through reasoned argument” (2012: 42-43). 
10 However, what does seem problematic is the invoking of what I believe are morally arbitrary 
features of the deportable: their level of cultural or social integration, their contribution to the 
community, etc. This does serve to strengthen an integrationist logic which has adverse effects for 
others. 
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The epistemic problem 
One challenge to those who believe that resistance is justified when it is aimed at 
redressing a “clear and substantial injustice” is to ask simply: clear to whom? How 
does the disobedient know that their interpretation of the situation as unjust is the 
right one? Especially when such laws have been the outcome of legitimate democratic 
procedures, it may seem unlikely that the judgement of individuals should be trusted 
over that of the democratic community as a whole or its political or bureaucratic 
representatives—and it might be anti-democratic to do so in any case. This epistemic 
question also came up in the case of Elin’s airplane protest. When a passenger 
complained that she was preventing many people from reaching their destination, 
Elin replied “but they’re not going to die, he’s going to die”, to which the man replied 
“how do you know that?” (Elin responded “because it’s Afghanistan”). Political 
scientist Andreas Heinemann-Grüder also commented disapprovingly on Elin’s 
actions: “She wasn't familiar with the concrete case. Was the Afghan in danger? Where 
in Afghanistan was he being deported [sic]? Not all parts of the country are 
dangerous” (Oberhäuser 2018). 
In response, we should start by noting that the strength of the epistemic 
objection varies with the precise aim of the disobedient act. I noted earlier that anti-
deportation action can be found on a spectrum between those contesting individual 
case decisions and those who seek to demonstrate their belief that all deportations are 
illegitimate. The former do not (necessarily) contest the abstract principles or general 
rules of the deportation regime, but only how the executive authorities have used their 
discretionary power to decide on an individual case. Therefore, they are not discarding 
the democratic right of the community to decide on its laws and thus are not facing 
this objection. As I noted earlier, classical defences of civil disobedience either require 
or praise when disobedience is aimed at changing laws rather than the outcome of 
individual cases—and may thus find it easier to accept deportation resistance with 
more all-encompassing rather than with more limited aims. But from a democratic 
egalitarian perspective, saying that the discretionary interpretation of the law in a 
particular case was wrong seems less intrusive than saying that a democratically 
formulated law is unjust, and thus easier to justify.  
We could also point out that certain actors are in a better epistemic position to 
know the (in)justice of a particular deportation. Those with direct relationships to the 
deportee may well have a better understanding of the individual circumstances of the 
would-be deportee than the democratic majority. Anti-deportation protests are often 
organised locally, and local communities may have a better understanding of who 
deserves to stay, who is well integrated, who would be harmed by deportation than 
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executive bureaucratic agencies which purportedly implement the abstract 
preferences of the national electorate. Moreover, even if we accept the epistemic value 
of democratic procedures to decide on the law, it is not clear where this leaves the 
argument when disagreement occurs between different levels of democratic 
government, in other words when democratically elected and accountable local 
governments or the democratically elected national governments of the countries to 
which the would-be deportee is destined to be sent frustrate deportation proceedings 
based on perceptions of justice and belonging that conflict with those of the 
democratically elected deporting government. Some have argued that the 
emancipatory and progressive potential of local conceptions of belonging and 
membership should lead us to empower urban communities to challenge national 
monopolies in immigration enforcement (Bauböck 2003; Lebuhn 2014). 
This does not, however, yet justify the involvement in deportation resistance by 
those like Elin Ersson who do not know much about the individual circumstances of 
the deportee whose removal they are trying to prevent. Here we can again turn the 
epistemic argument on its head, though, by pointing out that deportation is a 
particularly murky policy field in which the full effects of the law and its 
implementation are not well understood by the general public. In such circumstances, 
disobedience and resistance may well be necessary strategies to render the effects of 
deportation visible, to reveal the extent to which deportation is not a “routine 
administrative process” but rather, as William Walters describes it, “a site where 
sovereignty is (violently) performed, either the state negotiating with the subjects 
(thereby recognising them as subjects) or the state as armed bodies of men smashing 
down church doors, seizing, arresting, pacifying, terrifying, removing bodies in full 
display of the public” (2002: 287).  
A duty to resist deportation? 
So far, I have assumed that the question of just resistance is about permissibility and 
impermissibility. The vast majority of theoretical discussions also take this as the core 
question. However, we should use more fine-grained distinctions in considering the 
moral status of anti-deportation action. It can not only be forbidden and (merely) 
permissible but also laudable and even obligatory. There are hints in the literature that 
“[d]eliberate conscientious or principled law-breaking, by virtue of its apparently 
laudable motive, appears to be itself laudable (unlike law breaking that is merely self-
interested or malicious)” (Simmons 2003: 50), but precise analyses when disobedience 
is actually laudable rather than merely excusable remain rare. 
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In the case of deportation resistance, it is clear which category of action is 
laudable, namely that in which disobedients incur significant risks to prevent the 
deportation of others or publicise their own unjust deportability. Especially when 
those who are themselves at risk of deportation do engage in public and 
communicative action, despite thereby putting themselves at risk, this may be seen to 
contribute not to the justifiability of their action (as I argued earlier) but to its laudability. 
In very material ways, becoming visible and demanding rights “expose irregular 
migrants to the full force of state border controls” (Tyler and Marciniak 2013: 152). 
Those who protest while being held in pre-deportation detention centres, for instance, 
are sometimes fast-tracked for deportation. And by coming out of the shadows of 
irregularity, those in the sans-papiers and similar movements put themselves at 
considerably increased risk of deportation. Etienne Balibar wrote that “French 
citizens of all sexes, origins and professions, are greatly indebted to the ‘sans-papiers’ 
[for] breathing life back into democracy” (2000). 
The more difficult question is whether deportation resistance is ever obligatory. 
While most authors writing on principled disobedience mention that in certain 
circumstances there may not only be a right to disobey but in fact a duty to do so,11 
few of them specify when those conditions hold, and why and when a right to disobey 
turns into a duty to do so. In the deportation case, I want to suggest that there may 
be an obligation to resist and disobey for at least three types of actor. First are those 
whose actions are instrumental to the successful execution of an unjust deportation. 
These include the agents of the deportation machine, such as street-level bureaucrats 
and specialised police forces, as well as “enlisted” service providers, such as local 
officials, school and hospital employees, and (perhaps particularly) those private 
companies who benefit financially from the deportation system. The general public is 
also increasingly “enlisted” in the policing of immigration through legal obligations 
to monitor, report and refrain from interacting with irregular residents (Aliverti 2015), 
a process through which the actions (and non-actions) of ordinary citizens have 
become directly implicated in unjust deportation regimes. In those cases, the regular 
individuals in question may be under an obligation at least not to comply with such 
requirements. Javier Hidalgo (2016) goes even further by arguing that citizens of states 
that enforce unjust immigration restrictions have duties to actively disobey legal 
                                                          
11 Rawls writes (in the context of unjust warfare and the right of conscientious refusal of draftees): 
“if the aims of the conflict are sufficiently dubious and the likelihood of receiving flagrantly unjust 
demands is sufficiently great, one may have a duty and not only a right to refuse” (1999: 334-335). 
Raz writes: “civil disobedience is sometimes justified and occasionally is even obligatory” (1979: 262). 
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obligations imposed on them by the state to refrain from interacting with 
unauthorised immigrants.  
Second, those who by virtue of their institutional position have specific 
responsibilities towards the would-be deportees arguably have a duty to make efforts to 
stop their unjust deportation. Particularly, local authorities and destination countries 
come to mind here. Local political communities must generally comply with national 
dictates, but also have protection duties towards all those who are considered local 
citizens, and the conception of citizenship on the local level is, unlike national 
citizenship, based purely on residence (Bauböck 2015).  Therefore, mayors and local 
councillors would have not only a right but a duty to disobey top-down deportation 
orders and to shield local residents from unjust deportation efforts. Those states to 
which deportation states seek to send their deportees have a legal duty to international 
legal duty to accept back their own nationals, but they also have a duty to protect the 
fundamental interests of their citizens, which includes efforts to protect their right to 
stay in their place of residence when this is beyond the confines of the national 
territory.12 There is a difficulty that origin states face important epistemic limitations, 
as they are far removed from the case, and may be guided by mixed motivations, as 
they have a strong interest in keeping out unwanted, “unreformed” criminals or public 
security risks and ensuring the flow of remittances of citizens working abroad, which 
may cloud their judgement. In any case, when destination states simply frustrate 
deportations on other grounds than the injustice of the deportation (i.e. pretend not 
to believe the deportees are their nationals), this is unlikely to work towards changing 
the unjust laws and practices in the long term. Moreover, setting the precedent of 
barring entry to your own nationals risks leading to an infringement of the right to 
return to one’s country of nationality. Rainer Bauböck has therefore argued against 
applauding the practice of refusing to accept one’s own nationals as an appropriate 
response to unjust deportations, and that destination states must instead use 
diplomatic means to lobby for the rights of their nationals to stay in their country of 
residence (2009: 486). Of course, poor countries are not always in the best position 
to do this. Therefore, while intentional identity denial on the part of destination states 
is potentially problematic as it may render someone effectively stateless, in those cases 
where individuals themselves deny being from the country in question, the destination 
state could have a policy of non-cooperation (foot-dragging) with deportations that 
is permissible, laudable, or even obligatory.  
                                                          
12 Here it is important to clearly contrast between deportation and extradition, as the latter concerns 
mainly the rights of states to try and punish those who committed crimes in their jurisdiction, and 
the obligation of other states to reasonably facilitate this. 
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Third, a more general (and necessarily weaker) duty of citizen and non-citizen 
residents to resist the unjust deportation of their co-residents may be grounded in the 
associative duties they have towards their fellow residents. Republican theory, with its 
emphasis on good citizenship as consisting in a “vigilant commitment to holding the 
state to its domination-reducing aims, while preventing it from becoming a source of 
domination itself” (Lovett and Pettit 2009: 23) may provide insights here. On such an 
account, we could argue that individuals have moral reasons to engage in anti-
deportation activism not just for their friends, neighbours and colleagues, but because 
they share in the responsibility to keep their state’s power non-dominating, both 
because they themselves enjoy a non-dominated status in this state and because 
domination in one area might spill over into others and thus start affecting them. On 
Philip Pettit’s account, non-domination is a common good which “no one in a society 
enjoys unless everyone enjoys it” (1999). Matthew Hoye has on these grounds made 
the case that members of a political community have a duty to “stand up” for their 
fellow residents threatened with deportation in the interest of 
communitarian/republican liberty and non-domination “for immigrants and citizens 
alike” (2017: 164). 
Concluding thoughts 
In this paper I have argued that differently situated agents have different moral rights 
and duties to resist unjust deportations. An agent-sensitive normative framework for 
anti-deportation action must take into account the justifications which any particular 
agent may rely on and their motivation for engaging in the action, their epistemic 
position, and relationship to the injustice and its victim.  I have tried to sketch what 
such a framework would look like. By way of conclusion, I want to consider what the 
arguments in this paper imply for how the state should respond to resistance from 
these diverse actors.  
The first implication is that the state should listen to such signals and take them 
seriously, since some of these actors are epistemically better placed to judge whether 
someone’s individual circumstances indicate that they have a moral right to stay. States 
should design the deportation regime in such a way that there are legal and regular 
ways of contesting deportation for a variety of actors. One example which could be 
emulated by other countries are the Hardship Commissions in Germany. The second 
is that the state should refrain from punishing disobedience harshly or even at all, 
since the state must recognise that deportation decisions have far-reaching 
consequences and it therefore must operate on the assumption that opposition comes 
from a place of deep and often justified moral conviction. Moreover, to some extent 
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the state should welcome such resistance as “the activism of non-status immigrants 
and refugees is re-creating citizenship in ways that demands recognition and support, 
not criminalisation and securitisation” (Nyers 2003: 1090). Thirdly, the state must 
design its rules and policies in a way that does not place unnecessarily heavy burdens 
on people in official capacities, so it cannot incorporate school, hospitals and other 
service providers in its deportation enforcement regime. Brownlee has rightly argued 
that “when many office-holders refuse to perform certain tasks, and appeal to the 
very spirit of their office to legitimate their refusals, this signals that the minimum 
moral burdens principle may not be satisfied and that revision of the office or 
institution may be required” (2012: 116). If there is widespread dissatisfaction among 
those who have been made agents of the enforcement state, the state should take this 
seriously. 
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